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We investigate the effect of close customer relationships on small firms’ provision of 
trade credit during the 2001–2003 recession in Japan. Many studies argue that close 
customer relationships are costly for suppliers because when their main customer has a 
high proportion of the firm’s total sales, suppliers cannot easily find alternative 
customers. As a result, the supplier’s bargaining position is weaker. Then suppliers that 
depend largely on their main customer cannot easily reduce their provision of trade 
credit, despite the need to do so during a recession. The results in our paper indicate that 
close customer relationships are not costly for suppliers in trade credit contracts. First, 
small businesses offer less trade credit, even if the proportion of sales to their main 
customers is high. Second, suppliers offer less trade credit if they are in financial 
distress and charged higher interest rates by banks, even when they are dependent on 
their main customers. Third, highly leveraged dependent suppliers reduce trade credit, 
unlike highly leveraged independent suppliers. This implies that dependent suppliers 
can cut back on trade credit in the presence of leverage. These findings imply that close 
customer relationships are beneficial  for  suppliers.    
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1. Introduction 
We investigate whether small businesses can reduce their provision of trade credit if 
they face a liquidity shortage or severe financial stress. We focus on the effect of close 
customer relationships on small firms’ provision of trade credit. Trade credit is one of 
the largest sources of finance for firms that are customers of the firms supplying credit. 
In general, trade partners offer unsecured credit to their customers, so they incur large 
losses if their customers default. As a result, many nonfinancial firms offer trade credit 
and monitor the credit standing of their customers accordingly. The provision of trade 
credit is then costly for firms as it reduces the availability of working capital. Therefore, 
it is natural that creditworthy firms offer more credit than smaller less creditworthy 
firms. However, many studies suggest that not only creditworthy firms but also small 
and credit-constrained firms offer large amounts of trade credit (Marotta (2005)). There 
are several reasons for firms to continue to offer trade credit, even when they face 
financial constraints. For instance, several studies focus on the closer relationships 
between suppliers and customers (Wilson and Summers (2002), Fisman and Raturi 
(2004), and Burkart et al. (2009)). Importantly, where small businesses are highly 
dependent on a single main customer, they cannot easily find other customers. 
Therefore, these businesses depend heavily on their main customers and some of these 
customers may have bargaining power. Large customers especially have bargaining 
power, so they may delay repayment to suppliers, particularly during periods of severe 
financial distress ((Wilner (2000), Cunat (2007)). Furthermore, if suppliers require cash 
payments and reduce trade credit to their main customers, these customers may switch 
their transactions to other suppliers who offer more credit. Suppliers then have an 3 
 
incentive to maintain the customer–supplier relationships. As a result, they do not cut 
back on credit, even if they are credit constrained or suffering from a liquidity crisis.   
Alternatively, if the main customers have an incentive to maintain a relationship with 
their dependent suppliers, they pay more promptly so as to create cash flow for the 
suppliers (Banerjee et al. (2004)). Similarly, where the main customers also face 
difficulties finding alternative suppliers, they help their suppliers by cutting off trade 
credit. These imply that customer relationships are beneficial for suppliers. As a result, 
dependent suppliers can cut back on trade receivables when they face a liquidity 
shortage or severe financial stress.   
Many studies also investigate whether small businesses use trade payables when they 
face liquidity shocks (Cunat (2007)) or a deterioration in the availability of bank loans 
(Petersen and Rajan (1994)). However, few of these investigate whether small 
businesses can reduce their trade receivables when they have severe financial 
constraints. Additionally, although many papers argue that comparative bargaining 
strength matters in trade credit contracts, they focus on the cost of the 
customer–supplier relationship. We use Japanese small business data to investigate the 
provision of trade credit during the recession running from 2001 to 2003. In this period, 
the real growth rate of GDP in Japan dropped to around 0.2% in 2001 and 0.3% in 2002, 
althoughthe growth rate in 2001 was 2.9%. After 2003, the real GDP growth rate was 
enhanced to around 2%.   
In periods of recession, financial constraints in many firms are severe because cash 
flow decreases and the availability of bank loans falls. In these periods, suppliers 
attempt to reduce the provision of trade credit, but customers seek to retain their present 
level of credit. If close customer–supplier relationships are costly for suppliers in trade 4 
 
credit contracts, dependent suppliers in a weak bargaining position cannot reduce their 
provision of trade credit, despite their need to do so. If close customer–supplier 
relationships are beneficial for suppliers, dependent suppliers can reduce the provision 
of trade credit to mitigate the liquidity shortage. Our empirical questions are then as 
follows. First, can suppliers reduce credit provision if they face liquidity shocks? 
Second, do suppliers that depend more on their main customers offer more trade credit 
during a recession? Finally, do dependent suppliers maintain the provision of trade 
credit to their main customers, even when they face severe financial stress themselves?   
Our findings are as follows. First, suppliers offer less trade credit to customers if they 
are in financial distress and their banks charge higher interest rates. Suppliers also 
reduce their provision of trade credit if they have lower cash holdings. These results 
suggest that small businesses can alter their provision of trade credit if they face a 
liquidity shortage or severe financial stress. Second, the results are similar if we limit 
the sample to highly dependent suppliers, though this is inconsistent with the usual 
theory of bargaining power. In addition, small businesses offer less trade credit if the 
proportion of their sales to their main customers to total sales is higher in more severe 
recessions. Third, highly leveraged dependent firms reduce their trade credit, unlike 
highly leveraged independent firms. This implies that dependent firms can cut back on 
trade credit in the presence of high leverage. Our results thereby support the contention 
that closer customer–supplier relationships are beneficial.   
Many previous papers have investigated the effects of close customer–supplier 
relationships and the provision of trade credit. For example, Wilson and Summers 
(2002), Fisman and Raturi (2004), Van Horen (2004), Fabbri and Klapper (2008), and 
Burkart et al. (2009) argue that suppliers offer more trade credit because their main 5 
 
customers have bargaining power. Also, Cunat (2007) found that suppliers offer more 
trade credit to maintain their relationships if customers struggle with liquidity shocks. 
Conversely, Banerjee et al. (2004) found that the provision of trade credit for customers 
decreases with the proportion of sales accounted for by principal customers. This is 
inconsistent with the theory of bargaining power in trade credit contracts. Our analysis 
also does not support this theory. Instead, our findings support the argument of a benefit 
of close relationships between suppliers and customers. Given that we use data on small 
business credit behavior during a severe recession, our results are also robust. Our study 
suggests that dependent suppliers are not in a weak bargaining position. This is because 
if it is also costly for customers to find alternative suppliers, dependent suppliers can 
reduce trade credit to their customers. The results imply that the main customers cut 
back on trade credit from dependent suppliers that face a liquidity shortage or severe 
financial stress because they need to retain their close relationship.   
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we review the theoretical and 
empirical literature on trade credit. In section 3, we explain our hypothesis about the 
provision of trade credit. We describe our dataset in section 4 and discuss the empirical 
results in sections 5 and 6. Section 7 concludes the paper.   
2. Previous Studies 
Many studies investigate whether nonfinancial firms use trade credit if they have 
limited access to other sources of finance. Cunat (2007) found that suppliers offer more 
trade credit to maintain their relationships if customers struggle with liquidity shocks. 
Conversely, Banerjee et al. (2004) investigate the effect of financial crises on trade 
credit in emerging economies. They find that bank credit moves from financially 6 
 
stronger firms to weaker firms by using trade credit. Ono (2001), Uesugi (2005), and 
Tsuruta (2008) use Japanese data to investigate whether trade credit increases when 
bank loans fall. Cunat (2007) argue that firms in the UK use more trade credit when 
they face a liquidity shortage. 
As Miwa and Ramseyer (2008) argue, firms have a variety of ways of adjusting to 
financial shocks apart from using trade credit. One way is cutting trade receivables. As 
previous work has indicated, however, suppliers with weak bargaining power do not cut 
back on credit in order to maintain relationships with their customers. For example, 
Wilner (2000) suggests that when customers fall into financial distress, suppliers that 
depend on these customers make more concessions in their debt renegotiations.
1 
Furthermore, Cunat (2007) shows that suppliers offer more trade credit in periods when 
customers face temporary liquidity shocks. They assert that suppliers are insurance 
providers given it is costly for them to lose their current customers. Together, these 
imply that small businesses increase trade debt instead of cutting trade credit to their 
customers. In addition, close relationships with customers are costly for small 
businesses.  
Many studies investigate the relationship between bargaining strength and the 
provision of trade credit. Wilson and Summers (2002) show that firms in a sufficiently 
strong bargaining position (for example, larger firms, and buyers that dominate markets) 
are offered discounted credit terms. Also, the results of Summers and Wilson (2003) 
show that firms offer more credit to customers with a strong bargaining position. Using 
data from 42 developing countries, Van Horen (2004) shows that suppliers sell more on 
                                                 
1Alternatively, Tsuruta and Xu (2007) show that suppliers reduce the amount of trade credit for 
financially distressed customers. 7 
 
credit if the percentage of domestic sales sold to multinationals and to large domestic 
firms is higher. 
Fisman and Raturi (2004) use data from five African countries and shows that there is 
a positive relationship between monopoly power and credit provision. Van Horen 
(2007), using data from Eastern Europe and central Asia, found that if suppliers sell at 
least 20% of total sales to their three largest customers, they offer more credit. From 
these results, they insist that customer market power has a positive effect on trade credit 
provision. Burkart et al. (2009), using the National Survey of Small Businesses Finance 
(NSSBF) in the US, found that customers with bargaining power, which are large firms 
or firms in concentrated sectors, receive more trade credit on generally better terms. 
Fabbri and Klapper (2008) show that suppliers with relatively weaker market power 
offer more trade credit using firm-level data in China. Contrary to these studies, 
Banerjee et al. (2004) show that the provision of trade credit for customers decreases in 
proportion to the sales accounted for by principal customers, which is not consistent 
with the usual theory of bargaining power. Also, McMillan and Woodruff (1999) argue 
using Vietnamese data that customers that have difficulty finding alternative suppliers 
offer more credit. Molina and Preve (2009) investigate the trade receivables policy of 
distressed firms. They show that suppliers in financial distress seek to reduce trade 
receivables because of their cash flow problems.   
Many studies insist that the cost of trade credit is extremely high, which is called the
“2-10 net 30” contract (Ng et al. (1999)). Cunat (2007) and Wilner (2000) explain 
that as suppliers cannot reduce trade credit for their customers, even if they fail to pay 
because of financial distress, they offer higher interest rates to compensate for the cost 
of default. However, Miwa and Ramseyer (2008) show that suppliers do not only offer 8 
 
the “2-10 net 30” contract and that the cost of trade credit is not extremely high. 
Marotta (2005) also does not support the higher cost of trade credit. 
 
3. Hypothesis 
The provision of trade credit to customers is costly for suppliers, as they must finance 
all trade receivables until maturity. If the borrowing constraint is binding for customers, 
they must reduce their working capital and may therefore reduce inventory investment. 
In addition, they carry default risk and so suppliers must frequently monitor their 
customers’ creditworthiness, which suggests that they bear the monitoring costs. 
Therefore, as Petersen and Rajan (1997), Molina and Preve (2009), and 
Rodr´iguez-Rodr´iguez (2006) show, creditworthy firms offer more trade credit and 
firms in distress reduce trade credit for their customers. This suggests that if firms face 
liquidity shocks or a reduced supply of credit (for example, banks charge higher interest 
rates), they have every incentive to reduce trade credit to their customers.   
However, customers also have to find alternative sources of finance if their suppliers 
reduce trade credit. Especially in periods of monetary tightening, it is difficult for 
customers to find alternative financing sources. Therefore, the reduction of trade credit 
depends on customer–supplier relationships, especially whether the suppliers have a 
stronger bargaining position. If suppliers have alternative customers and do not suffer 
large losses from losing some current customers, they can easily demand cash payment 
and reduce trade credit to their customers in the presence of a liquidity shortage. In 
particular, when customers have an incentive to retain their relationship with their 
supplier, they offer to cut back on trade credit from the supplier to ease the liquidity 9 
 
shortage. On the other hand, if suppliers expect to make large losses if they were to 
cease transactions with their current customers, they cannot offer to reduce the 
provision of credit. If suppliers offer cash payment, customers that have alternative 
suppliers may switch to more creditworthy suppliers. In this case, the customers have a 
strong bargaining position. Many studies (for example, Wilner (2000)) show that the 
degree of dependence on sales to customers determines bargaining strength. If suppliers 
sell a large proportion of their products or services to their main customers, they suffer 
large losses if they lose these transactions. This suggests that customers with a larger 
share of total sales have relatively stronger bargaining power.   
We consider several hypotheses. First, we investigate whether suppliers are less 
likely to reduce trade credit to their customers, even in recessionary periods. If close 
customer–supplier relationships are costly for suppliers, those that depend on their main 
customers reduce trade credit less in that period. Second, if close customer–supplier 
relationships are costly for suppliers, they reduce credit to customers without a close 
customer–supplier relationship, but less than in the presence of financial distress or a 
reduction in bank loans. Following earlier work (for example, Banerjee et al. (2004)), 
we use the ratio of sales for the largest customer to total sales as a proxy for the 
closeness of the customer–supplier relationship.   
4. Data 
We used data on small businesses from the “2001 Survey of Corporate Procurement,” 
the “2002 Survey of the Financial Environment,” and the “2003 Survey of the 
Corporate Financial Environment” (hereafter, SFE) conducted by the Small and 
Medium Enterprise Agency of Japan. These data include many “small and medium 10 
 
enterprises” (SMEs) defined under the Small and Medium Enterprise Basic Law in 
Japan.
2 These surveys extract random samples from the Tokyo Shoko Research 
Database and send questionnaires to selected firms. There were 7,656 firms surveyed in 
2001 and 8,446 in 2002. The median number of employees is 38, the first quartile is 17 
employees, and the third quartile is 93 employees.   
These surveys asked questions related to the transactions and financing of small 
businesses. One of the questions in the Survey of the Financial Environment asked the 
ratio of sales to the main customer to total sales. In this survey, respondents selected one 
of the following seven answers: less than 20%, between 20% and 40%, between 40% 
and 60%, between 60% and 80%, between 80% and 100%, and 100%. We use this ratio 
as the proxy for the closeness of the relationship. The number of firms which answered 
the question relating to the ratio of sales to the biggest customer to total sales was 7,381. 
In addition, we have data on about 3,754 firms in 2003 and 3,077 firms in 2001. These 
surveys also provide financial information on the small businesses. Nine industrial 
classifications are included: construction, manufacturing, transportation, information 
and communications, wholesale trade, retail trade, real estate, restaurants, and services.   
In table 1, we show the distribution of percentage of sales to the main customer. 
According to this table, many firms do not depend largely on their main customer. The 
share of sales to such customers was less than 20% in 47.85% of firms. If we limit the 
study to firms that employ five workers or less, that percentage is 29.41%. On the other 
hand, the number of firms with a high dependence ratio is not significant. The share of 
sales is 60% or more in 16.32% of firms, and 2.34% of firms are completely dependent 
on a single customer so that the percentage of such sales is 100In table 2, we show the 
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median ratios of trade receivables, cash holdings, trade payables, and short-term 
borrowings to total assets. According to this table, the ratio of trade receivables to total 
assets is about 21% to 24%, which is larger than the ratio of cash holdings. Also, this 
ratio is larger than the ratios of trade payables and short-term borrowings. These 
findings show that collecting trade receivables is a large financial source for small 
businesses.  
5. The Determinants of Trade Receivables 
5-1. Empirical Strategy 
In this paper, we estimate the following regression.   
 
  12 Trade Receivables Customer Relationships Creditworthiness it i it α α =+  (1) 
  3Interest Rateit it it X α ε + ++  
X = (Firm Scale, Firm Age, Firm Performance, Industrial Dummies, Year Dummies).   
 
Following Petersen and Rajan (1997), we use the ratio of trade receivables to sales as 
a proxy for trade receivables, meaning the period of trade credit offered by the supplier. 
If suppliers with close relationships with their customers do not decrease trade credit 
during the recession, they offer credit for longer periods and the ratio will be larger. In 
addition, they do not shorten the period of trade credit if their bargaining position is 
weak.  
We use the percentage of sales for the main customer (defined as those purchasing 
the largest share of total sales) as the proxy for customer relationships. Suppliers suffer 12 
 
large losses if the customer that purchases the largest share of the supplier’s total sales 
stops buying. Therefore, such customers have strong bargaining power and suppliers 
make every effort to maintain relationships with their main customers. On the other 
hand, if the share of the main customer is smaller, the supplier incurs little loss if the 
relationship is broken. We predict that the percentage of sales has a positive effect for 
trade receivables if close relationships with suppliers are costly for suppliers. However, 
if dependent suppliers are not in a weak bargaining position and the close relationships 
with suppliers are beneficial for customers, the percentage of sales has a negative effect 
on trade receivables.   
Petersen and Rajan (1997) show that creditworthy firms and firms with easy access to 
financing offer more trade credit. Similarly, we hypothesize that creditworthy firms 
offer more trade credit. Firms with low credit availability do not have an incentive to 
offer trade credit because provision is costly. Therefore, we predict that firms facing 
higher interest rates offer less trade credit. We use firm scale, firm age, and firm 
performance as control variables. For example, Long et al. (1993) show that younger 
firms offer more credit to allow customers to evaluate the quality of their product prior 
to payment. Following these results, we expect the coefficient of firm age to have a 
negative effect on trade credit. We also predict that better-performing firms offer more 
credit.  
To investigate whether small businesses reduce their trade receivables, we also 
employ an estimation using the annual change in trade receivables.   
 
1 Annual Change in Trade Receivables Customer Relationships it i β =  (2) 
  23 Creditworthiness Interest Rate it it β β ++4Liquidityit it it Z β ζ + ++ 13 
 
Z = (Firm Scale, Firm Age, Firm Performance, Industrial Dummies, Year Dummies).   
 
We use the annual change in the trade receivables to sales ratio as the dependent 
variable. If their customers’ bargaining position matters, suppliers with close customer 
relationships do not shorten the period of trade credit. The proxy for customer 
relationships is the same as in equation (2). We predict that firms with lower liquidity 
reduce their provision of trade credit, as they need more cash holdings. Some variables 
are not available for all samples. In addition, when variables include outliers, we 
truncate them at the 0.5 or 99.5 percentiles of the sample. The sample size is 10,321 in 
equation (1) and 4,913 in equation (2). We provide summary statistics for each variable 
in table 3. The definition of each variable is in the appendix.   
5-2. Results of Trade Receivables–Sales Ratio 
We show the results of ordinary least squares (OLS) using the trade receivables–sales 
ratio as the dependent variable in table 4. We use capital deficiency and interest rates as 
proxies for creditworthiness, and return on assets (ROA) and sales growth as proxies for 
firm performance. In columns (1) and (2), we provide estimates of the dummy variables 
for the percentage of sales to the main customer. The reference category is when the 
percentage of sales to the main customer is “less than 20%.” The effects of the dummy 
variables for “20%–40%” and “40%–60%” are negative, but not statistically significant. 
However, the effects of the dummy variables for “60%–80%,” “80%–100%,” and 
“100%” are negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. Moreover, the 
magnitudes of the dummy variables for the dependence on main customers are larger as 
suppliers depend more on sales to their main customers. In column (3) of table 4, we 14 
 
also estimate dummy variables with a value of 1 if the percentage of sales to the main 
customers is 40% or more; zero otherwise. The results are still statistically negative at 
the 1% level. In addition, the results are similar if we change the dummy variable to 
have a value of 1 if the percentage of sales to main customers is 60% or more (column 
(4)). If suppliers with close relationships offer more credit because of a weak bargaining 
position, the effects of dependence on the main customer must be statistically positive. 
However, our results show that suppliers that depend on the main customer offer less 
trade credit, suggesting that the cost of a close relationship with the main customers 
does not matter for suppliers. 
3  
As discussed, we estimate the effects of several variables. The results are consistent 
with our argument in the absence of controls for firm performance. The effect of 
ln(asset) is positive while the effect of interest rates is negative; both are statistically 
significant at the 1% level. Generally, larger firms and firms that can borrow at lower 
interest rates are more creditworthy. In addition, capital deficiency has a negative effect 
and is statistically significant at either the 1% or 10% level. We interpret this as 
meaning that more financial distressed firms offer less trade credit. In addition, firm age 
has a negative effect on the trade receivables–sales ratio. This suggests that younger 
firms offer more credit to mitigate the problem of information asymmetry. The 
coefficients for ROA are negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. If we add 
sales growth as a proxy for firm performance, the coefficient for ROA becomes 
statistically significant at the 5% level and sales growth significantly negative at the 1% 
level (column (2)). Similar to Petersen and Rajan (1997),, our results suggest that firms 
                                                 
3We also estimate the effects of the length of the relationship with main customers as a proxy for 
customer relationships, similar to Uchida et al. (2006). These effects are not statistically significant, 
suggesting that the length of the relationship has little effect on the provision of trade credit. 15 
 
with declining sales extend credit to their customers to maintain sales. Moreover, firms 
with increasing sales reduce their provision of trade credit because they need the cash 
for inventory investment. 
4  
5-3. Results of Trade Receivables–Sales Ratio Differences 
In table 5, we specify the annual change in the trade receivables–sales ratio as the 
dependent variable. We use the annual change in the interest rate and leverage as 
proxies for firm creditworthiness. In addition, we add the cash–total assets ratio because 
cash-rich firms can better extend trade credit. Sales growth and the annual change in 
ROA are proxies for firm performance. We also include firm age and scale as control 
variables.  
The variables representing dependence on the main customer are the same as in table 
4. In column (1) of table 5, we regress the effects of each dummy variable for 
dependence. In columns (2) and (3), we change the dummies to “40% or more” or “60% 
or more”. If suppliers with close relationships cannot reduce trade credit for their 
customers even during the recession, the effects of dependence on the main customer 
must be statistically positive. However, our empirical results do not support this view. 
The result of column (1) shows that the coefficients of dependence dummies are 
statistically insignificant. These results are similar if we change the dummy variables 
for dependence on the main customer (in columns (2) and (3)). These results suggest 
that suppliers with greater dependence on their main customer do not increase trade 
credit more during the recession, implying that suppliers with close relationships are not 
                                                 
4Also, the trade receivable-sales ratio for firms with sales decline might be over-biased because of the lag 
between the decrease in trade receivables and the decrease in sales. 16 
 
in a weaker bargaining position.
5  
The results for the control variables indicate that uncreditworthy firms reduce trade 
credit provision. Leverage has a statistically significant negative effect on the annual 
change in the trade receivables–sales ratio. This is because highly leveraged firms are 
more likely to default and cannot borrow easily, so they are in a tight financial condition. 
Thus, highly leveraged firms reduce trade credit provision for their customers. The 
coefficients for the annual change in interest rates are negative and statistically 
significant at the 5% level. This is consistent with our hypothesis that suppliers that pay 
higher interest rates reduce trade credit more. In addition, firms with lower cash 
holdings also reduce trade credit. This is because they do not have enough cash to pay 
off their current liabilities and so they have an incentive to reduce credit to increase 
their cash holdings. The annual change in ROA has a positive effect, suggesting that 
better-performing firms increase trade credit. However, similar to the result in table 4, 
sales growth has a negative effect on the increase in trade credit. This also shows that 
firms with declining sales extend trade credit to maintain relationships. The effects of 
ln(assets) and ln(1+age) are not statistically significant.   
5-4. Robustness Check 
In the previous subsection, we showed that suppliers with greater dependence on their 
main customer offer less trade credit. Given the regression includes the entire sample, 
many affiliated firms may be included. In this situation, affiliated firms may largely 
depend on their sales to the parent company, and so our results may be affected by the 
inclusion of these firms in the sample. Unfortunately, ownership data is unavailable so 
                                                 
5Similar to the result in table 4, the length of the relationship has little effect on the annual change in trade 17 
 
we cannot identify which firms are affiliated. However, we can identify some firms as 
nonaffiliated firms. The 2003 SFE questions firms about the amount of capital from 
other firms in the establishment. Firms without financing from other firms are 
considered nonaffiliated and so we limit the analysis to these firms. We regress equation 
(1) and equation (2) using the subsample of nonaffiliated firms. The results are shown in 
tables 6 and 7   
Table 6 shows the results for the trade receivables–sales ratio. The coefficients on the 
dummy variables for dependence are not statistically significant (columns (1) and (2)). 
If we change the definition of the dummy variables for dependence, the effects of 
dependence has a negative effect on the trade receivables–sales ratio, but it is not 
statistically significant (columns (3) and (4)). These results suggest that suppliers that 
depend on their main customers do not offer more trade credit, even if we limit our 
analysis to nonaffiliated firms. The results for the other variables are similar to those in 
table 4. The results in table 6 suggest that financially distressed firms, firms with higher 
interest rates, and smaller firms offer less trade credit to their customers. In contrast, 
poorly performing firms offer more credit.   
Table 7 provides the results for the annual change in the trade receivables–sales ratio. 
The dummy variables indicating the percentage of sales to the main customer are 
statistically insignificant (column (1)). If we use dummy variables for when the 
percentage of sales to the main customer is 40% or 60% and more, the effects of 
dependence on the main customers are negative but statistically insignificant (columns 
(2) and (3)). These results also suggest that firms that depend on their main customers 
do not increase trade receivables more in the recession, even if we limit ourselves to 
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nonaffiliated firms.   
6. Customer Relationships and Economic Shocks 
6-1. Empirical Strategy 
We find that the size of the ratio of sales to main customers has a negative effect on the 
trade receivables–sales ratio. However, these results may be misleading because of 
omitted variable bias. First, we do not control for the effects of the characteristics of 
customers because such data are unavailable. If customers are creditworthy, they pay 
cash sooner than uncreditworthy customers. Therefore, the error term ( it ε ) includes the 
effect of customer characteristics. If dependent suppliers have a relationship with more 
creditworthy customers, the error term may be correlated with the ratio of sales to main 
customers, implying that α  is biased because of endogeneity. To mitigate the 
endogeneity problem, we use fixed effects estimation. The main customer does not 
change frequently and so we can assume that the time-invariant effects include 
customer characteristics. In our dataset, however, the ratio of sales for main customers 
is also time-invariant; thus, we cannot estimate the fixed effects model to estimate the 
coefficient of the ratio of sales to the main customer. We then have to adopt another 
empirical strategy to investigate the effects of bargaining power and mitigate the 
endogeneity problem.   
In the previous section, we find that uncreditworthy suppliers offer less trade credit to 
their customers. Suppliers that encounter financial distress and rising interest rates also 
reduce their provision of trade credit to their customers, as do firms with lower cash 
holdings. If suppliers with close customer relationships do not reduce the provision of 19 
 
trade credit in order to maintain these relationships, they reduce their trade credit less 
than other suppliers. To check this hypothesis, we divide the sample into three groups 
according to the percentage of sales to the main suppliers and estimate equation (1) after 
excluding the proxies for customer relationships for each group using the fixed effects 
model. By dividing the sample and using the fixed effects model, we mitigate the 
problem of endogeneity.   
6-2. Results 
6-2-1. The level of trade receivables ratio 
In table 8, we use the trade receivables–sales ratio as a dependent variable. In column 
(1), we use the sample of firms that depend on their main customers less than 20%: that 
is, those in a weak relationship with their customers. Similar to the results in table 4, 
larger firms and firms with a lower ROA offer more trade credit. These results suggest 
that firms with lower profitability offer more trade credit, but they do not suggest that 
uncreditworthy firms offer less trade credit because of financial constraints. In column 
(2), we use the sample of firms whose percentage of sales to their main customers is 
20%–40%. The results suggest that suppliers with high interest rates and smaller 
suppliers offer less trade credit, whereas firms with a capital deficiency offer more 
credit.  
Dependent and uncreditworthy firms offer less credit, whereas independent and 
uncreditworthy firms do not offer less credit. In column (3), we use the sample of firms 
that depend largely on their main customers, that is, the percentage of their sales to the 
main customer is 40% or more. The results of capital deficiency and interest rates are 20 
 
significantly negative at the 1% or 10% level, suggesting that dependent and 
uncreditworthy firms offer less trade credit. Similar to column (1), the effect of ROA is 
negative. These suggest that firms with lower performance offer more credit to maintain 
relationships with their customers. Ln(asset) gives similar results to those in columns (1) 
and (2). If dependent suppliers offer credit to maintain relationships with their main 
customers, they offer more credit even though banks charge higher interest rates and 
they suffer a capital deficiency (column (3)). These results are inconsistent with the 
theory of bargaining power and consistent with the notion of a benefit from close 
customer relationships.   
6-2-2. The annual change in the trade receivables ratio 
The results for the annual change in the trade receivables–sales ratio for each group are 
shown in table 9. The F-test for individual effects is not statistically significant and so 
we use the OLS model in table 9. The coefficients for sales growth and cash holdings 
are similar to the results in table 5: this does not depend on the percentage of sales to the 
main customer. The result for leverage differs between each group. If we limit ourselves 
to dependent suppliers, the effects of leverage are negative and statistically significant. 
This indicates that dependent suppliers with decreasing sales increase the provision of 
trade credit for their customers. Although we do not have data about trade receivables 
and sales for all customers, total sales could be a proxy for sales to main customers 
where the percentage of sales is high. We conclude that if sales to the main customers 
are decreasing, suppliers offer more trade credit. This fits the account of Petersen and 
Rajan (1997). However, if dependent suppliers encounter financial distress, they reduce 
the provision of trade credit to their customers, whereas independent suppliers do not. 21 
 
As mentioned in Molina and Preve (2009), the cost of the provision of trade credit is 
higherif suppliers face financial distress. Therefore, they reduce trade credit despite 
their dependence. These results support the existence of a benefit of close customer 
relationships for suppliers. 
6  
7. Conclusion 
We investigate whether close customer relationships are costly or beneficial in trade 
credit contracts. Our results do not support the usual theory of bargaining power and the 
cost of closeness in customer relationships. First, small businesses offer less trade credit 
if sales to their main customers represent a higher proportion of total sales during a 
severe recession. Second, highly dependent firms offer less trade credit if they are in 
financial distress and charged higher interest rates by their banks. Third, highly 
leveraged dependent firms reduce trade credit unlike highly leveraged dependent firms. 
This implies that independent firms cut back on trade credit when they have high 
leverage, suggesting that close customer relationships are beneficial for suppliers.   
Appendix: Definition of Variables 
• Trade Receivables–Sales Ratio  = The ratio of a firm’s trade receivables to 
sales.  
• Annual Change in Trade Receivables–Sales Ratio  = Trade 
receivables–sales ratio in t+1 to trade receivables–sales ratio in t.   
• Capital Deficiency    = 1 if a firm’s capital is negative.   
                                                 
6In addition, the coefficient of ln(asset) is significant if we limit the analysis to firms with high 
dependence (column (2)).   22 
 
• Leverage    = The ratio of a firm’s liabilities to total assets.   
• ROA    = The ratio of a firm’s operating income to total assets.   
• Annual Change in ROA    = ROA in t+1 to ROA in t.   
• Sales Growth    = The annual growth rate of a firm’s sales (Δ sales/total sales).   
• Cash–Total Assets Ratio    = The ratio of a firm’s cash holdings to total assets.   
• Total Assets–Sales Ratio    = The ratio of a firm’s total sales to assets.   
• Interest Rates  = The ratio of a firm’s interest expenses to the sum of its 
short-term debt, long-term debt, and discounted notes receivable.   
• ln(Assets)    = Natural log of assets.   
• ln(1+Firm Age)    = Natural log of 1 plus firm age.   23 
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Table 1. The Level of Dependence on the Main Customer 
 
Dependence on    Firm Size: Number of Workers     
the Main Customer    –5    6–20    21–50  51–100  101–300  300–    Total  
Less than 20%    120    824    983    650    621    334    3,532  
  (29.41)    (42.02)  (49.87)  (51.59)  (52.49)  (55.85)    (47.85)  
20%–40%    99    527    487    291    247    96    1,747  
  (24.26)    (26.87)  (24.71)  (23.10)  (20.88)  (16.05)    (23.67)  
40%–60%    70    290    206    133    131    67    897  
  (17.16)    (14.79)  (10.45)  (10.56)  (11.07)  (11.20)    (12.15)  
60%–80%    62    156    137    93    81    47    576  
  (15.20)    (7.96)  (6.95)  (7.38)  (6.85)  (7.86)    (7.80)  
80%–100%    37    116    116    66    76    45    456  
  (9.07)    (5.92)  (5.89)  (5.24)  (6.42)  (7.53)    (6.18)  
100%    20    48    42    27    27    9    173  
  (4.90)    (2.45)  (2.13)  (2.14)  (2.28)  (1.51)    (2.34)  
Total    408    1,961  1,971  1,260  1,183  598    7,381  
  (100.00)    (100.00)  (100.00)  (100.00)  (100.00)  (100.00)    (100.00) 
 
Note: “Dependence on the Main Customer” is (Sales for the Main Customer)/(Total Sales)   
 
 
Table 2. Trade Credit, Cash Holding, and Short-term Borrowings 
 
  Cash Holdings    Trade Receivables  Trade Payables  ST Borrowings   
2001    0.1437    0.2292    0.1729    0.1095   
2002    0.1450    0.2195    0.1636    0.1088   
2003    0.1430    0.2425    0.1772    0.1009   
Total    0.1440    0.2304    0.1710    0.1063   
 
Note: We show the median ratio of each assets and debts normalized by total assets.  27 
 
Table 3. Summary Statistics 
 
Variable N mean sd min p1 p50 p99 max
Trade Receivables - Sales Ratio  10,321 0.198 0.141 0.000 0.000 0.177 0.614 2.098
20%-40% 10,321 0.240 0.427 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
40%-60% 10,321 0.118 0.323 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
60%-80% 10,321 0.071 0.256 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
80%-100% 10,321 0.052 0.222 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
100% 10,321 0.023 0.149 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
Interest Rates 10,321 0.025 0.018 0.000 0.000 0.023 0.099 0.277
ROA 10,321 0.021 0.057 -0.556 -0.168 0.020 0.182 0.314
Sales Growth 4,246 -0.035 0.220 -1.000 -0.673 -0.037 0.669 2.343
Capital Deficiency 10,321 0.058 0.233 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
ln (Assets) 10,321 14.033 1.535 7.772 10.504 13.983 17.715 20.516
ln (1+Firm Age) 10,321 3.575 0.682 0.000 1.386 3.689 4.836 7.590
Variable N mean sd min p1 p50 p99 max
Annual Change in Trade Receivables - Sales Ratio  4,913 -0.003 0.068 -0.700 -0.197 -0.002 0.188 1.090
20%-40% 4,913 0.244 0.429 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
40%-60% 4,913 0.112 0.315 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
60%-80% 4,913 0.068 0.252 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
80%-100% 4,913 0.048 0.213 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
100% 4,913 0.019 0.136 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
Annual Change in ROA 4,913 -0.004 0.052 -0.508 -0.177 -0.002 0.153 0.473
Sales Growth 4,913 -0.027 0.206 -0.999 -0.516 -0.036 0.669 2.343
Leverage 4,913 0.745 0.223 0.023 0.206 0.777 1.395 2.425
Cash-Total Assets Ratio 4,913 0.165 0.117 0.000 0.007 0.140 0.545 0.831
Annual Change in Interest Rate 4,913 0.000 0.015 -0.192 -0.031 0.000 0.044 0.238
ln (Assets) 4,913 14.158 1.407 9.079 11.081 14.110 17.622 18.357
ln (1+Firm Age) 4,913 3.698 0.561 0.000 1.946 3.761 4.836 7.590
A: Dependent Variable=Trade Receivables - Sales Ratio
B: Dependent Variable=Annual Change in Trade Receivables - Sales Ratio
 28 
 
Table 4. Dependence on the Main Customer and the Trade Receivables Ratio 
 
Dependent Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Capital Deficiency -0.012* -0.027*** -0.012* -0.012*
(0.006) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006)
ROA -0.164*** -0.063** -0.163*** -0.163***
(0.027) (0.031) (0.027) (0.027)
Sales Growth -0.041***
(0.011)
Interest Rates -0.587*** -0.630*** -0.605*** -0.599***
(0.101) (0.129) (0.101) (0.101)
ln (Assets) 0.021*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.021***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
ln (1+Firm Age) -0.008*** -0.005* -0.008*** -0.008***















Year Dummy (2001) 0.003 0.000 0.002 0.002
(0.004) (0.000) (0.005) (0.005)
Year Dummy (2002) -0.006 -0.007 -0.006 -0.006
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 10,321 4,246 10,321 10,321
R-squared 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12
Percentage of Sales to the Top Customer
Trade Receivables -- Sales Ratio 
 
 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
∗ represents significance at the 10% level, 
∗∗  represents 
significance at the 5% level, and 
∗∗∗  represents significance at the 1% level. Each regression includes 
nine industrial dummies recorded in the data set.   
 29 
 




Annual Change in ROA 0.063** 0.063** 0.064**
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Cash-Total Assets Ratio 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.038***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Sales Growth -0.066*** -0.066*** -0.066***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Leverage -0.009* -0.009* -0.009*
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Annual Change in Interest Rate-0.192** -0.190** -0.189**
(0.078) (0.078) (0.078)
ln (Assets) -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
















Year Dummy (2001) -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 4,913 4,913 4,913
R-squared 0.05 0.05 0.05
Percentage of Sales to the Top Customer
Annual Change in
 Trade Receivables -- Sales Ratio 
 
 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
∗ represents significance at the 10% level, 
∗∗  represents 
significance at the 5% level, and 
∗∗∗  represents significance at the 1% level. Each regression includes 
nine industrial dummies recorded in the data set.   30 
 
Table 6. Dependence on the Main Customer and the Trade Receivables Ratio 
(Nonaffiliated Firms Only)  
 
Dependent Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Capital Deficiency -0.056*** -0.055*** -0.057*** -0.057***
(0.013) (0.016) (0.013) (0.013)
ROA -0.115** -0.005 -0.116** -0.117**
(0.052) (0.060) (0.052) (0.052)
Sales Growth -0.072***
(0.019)
Interest Rates -0.732*** -0.650*** -0.721*** -0.729***
(0.218) (0.236) (0.216) (0.217)
ln (Assets) 0.022*** 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.022***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
ln (1+Firm Age) -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003















Year Dummy (2001) -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001
(0.009) (0.000) (0.009) (0.009)
Year Dummy (2002) -0.011 -0.006 -0.011 -0.011
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Observations 1,872 1,214 1,872 1,872
R-squared 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12
Percentage of Sales to the Top Customer
Trade Receivables -- Sales Ratio 
 
 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
∗ represents significance at the 10% level, 
∗∗  represents 
significance at the 5% level, and 
∗∗∗  represents significance at the 1% level. Each regression includes 
nine industrial dummies recorded in the data set.   31 
 
Table 7. Dependence on the Main Customer and the Annual Change in Trade Receivables Ratio 




Annual Change in ROA 0.076 0.079 0.080
(0.056) (0.057) (0.057)
Cash-Total Assets Ratio 0.034* 0.034* 0.034*
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Sales Growth -0.090*** -0.090*** -0.090***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Leverage 0.008 0.009 0.009
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Annual Change in Interest Rate-0.045 -0.049 -0.044
(0.185) (0.186) (0.184)
ln (Assets) -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
















Year Dummy (2001) -0.006 -0.006 -0.006
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 1,180 1,180 1,180
R-squared 0.08 0.08 0.08
Percentage of Sales to the Top Customer
Annual Change in
 Trade Receivables -- Sales Ratio 
 
 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
∗ represents significance at the 10% level, 
∗∗  represents 
significance at the 5% level, and 
∗∗∗  represents significance at the 1% level. Each regression includes 
nine industrial dummies recorded in the data set.   32 
 
Table 8. Determinant of the Trade Receivables Ratio, by the Level of Dependence on the Main 
Customer 




Sales to the Top Customer less than 20% 20%-40% 40%-
Capital Deficiency -0.019 0.053*** -0.091***
(0.012) (0.019) (0.016)
ROA -0.087** -0.076 -0.137***
(0.036) (0.059) (0.036)
Interest Rates -0.139 -0.552*** -0.279*
(0.114) (0.187) (0.156)
ln (Assets) 0.020*** 0.013*** 0.026***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.006)
ln (1+Firm Age) 0.000 0.009** 0.001
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003)
Year Dummy (2001) 0.005 0.000 0.009**
(0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
Year Dummy (2002) -0.002 -0.006 -0.001
(0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
Observations 5,118 2,482 2,721
R-squared 0.04 0.04 0.07
Trade Receivables -- Sales Ratio 
 
 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
∗ represents significance at the 10% level, 
∗∗  represents 
significance at the 5% level, and 
∗∗∗  represents significance at the 1% level. Each regression includes 
nine industrial dummies recorded in the data set.   33 
 
Table 9. Determinants of the Annual Change in Trade Receivables Ratio 




Sales to the Top Customer less than 20% 20%-40% 40%-
Annual Change in ROA 0.058 0.108 0.049
(0.038) (0.070) (0.038)
Cash-Total Assets Ratio 0.044*** 0.030* 0.031*
(0.013) (0.017) (0.016)
Sales Growth -0.047*** -0.100*** -0.071***
(0.014) (0.027) (0.019)
Leverage -0.005 -0.006 -0.017*
(0.006) (0.013) (0.010)
Annual Change in Interest Rate -0.069 -0.318 -0.235
(0.083) (0.197) (0.159)
ln (Assets) -0.002** -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002)
ln (1+Firm Age) -0.003 -0.005 0.001
(0.002) (0.005) (0.005)
Year Dummy (2001) -0.008*** -0.012*** -0.009**
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 2,504 1,198 1,211
R-squared 0.04 0.07 0.07
Annual Change in Trade Receivables -- Sales Ratio 
 
 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
∗ represents significance at the 10% level, 
∗∗  represents 
significance at the 5% level, and 
∗∗∗  represents significance at the 1% level. Each regression includes 
nine industrial dummies recorded in the data set.   
 